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The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you
desire to appear.
Socrates1
I don’t give a damn ‘bout my bad reputation.
Joan Jett2
INTRODUCTION
As we write this review, the United States is gripped by one
of the most contentious and outlandish presidential elections in
recent memory.3 Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the most conservative justices in the history of the modern Supreme Court, died in
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†† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The authors thank the twentyone judges in the Duke Judicial Studies LLM program (2016–17), Tom Ginsburg, and Jack
Knight for comments. Susanna Rychlak provided excellent research assistance.
1
Edward Parsons Day, Day’s Collacon: An Encyclopædia of Prose Quotations 789 (International Printing and Publication Office 1884) (attributing this quotation to Socrates).
Professors Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg begin their book with two quotes which preview their thinking about reputation: Benjamin Franklin’s line that “[i]t takes many good
deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it,” and Michael Iapoce’s less
well-known observation that “[r]eputation is character minus what you’ve been caught
doing” (p vii). Hopefully our quotes offer a similar insight to our modest project here.
2
Joan Jett, Bad Reputation (Boardwalk Records 1981), lyrics available at
http://perma.cc/L22C-B6PU.
3
See Patrick Healy and Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Win
Easily in New York Primary (NY Times, Apr 19, 2016), online at http://www
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the midst of this political whirlwind,4 and the nomination process
for his successor has been sucked into the vortex. President
Barack Obama expressed frustration with Senate Republicans,
who hold a majority and have promised not to allow a vote, hold
hearings, or even meet the candidate: “At that point, the judiciary
becomes a pure extension of politics. And that damages people’s
faith in the judiciary.”5 By implication, the public’s view of courts
matters.
Law professors Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg have published an ambitious book that seeks to account for the great diversity of judicial systems based, in part, on the public’s opinion of
courts. The structural features of courts, such as whether the
judges are permitted to (and do) publish dissents, Garoupa and
Ginsburg explain, can have a significant impact on the public’s
opinion of courts. Drawing on their own prodigious writings, the
authors propose a reputation theory “to explain how judges respond to the incentives provided by different audiences and how
legal systems design their judicial institutions to calibrate the locally appropriate balance between audiences” (p 7).6 Judges care
about their reputations. And reputation serves as both cause and
effect of the design of courts.
Judicial reputation in Garoupa and Ginsburg’s book operates
on many levels. A judge has a reputation, but so too does a court

.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/us/politics/new-york-primary.html (visited May 6, 2016) (Perma
archive unavailable).
4
See Wilson Andrews, Jeremy Bowers, and K.K. Rebecca Lai, How Scalia Compared with Other Justices (NY Times, Feb 14, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/02/14/us/supreme-court-justice-ideology-scalia.html (visited Apr 29,
2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (showing, based on work by Professors Lee Epstein,
Andrew D. Martin, and Kevin Quinn, that Scalia was the second most conservative justice
during nearly all of his tenure and holds roughly the same spot—second or third—among
all justices who have served since 1937).
5
Transcript and Video: President Obama’s Interview with NPR’s Nina Totenberg
(NPR, Mar 18, 2016), online at http://www.npr.org/2016/03/18/470869897/transcript-and
-video-president-obamas-interview-with-nprs-nina-totenberg (visited Apr 29, 2016)
(Perma archive unavailable).
6
Prior scholars have also emphasized the importance of understanding judicial behavior as a function of the different audiences judges are seeking to speak to, albeit not in
the context of a reputational theory drawn as sharply as that of Garoupa and Ginsburg.
See generally, for example, Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective
on Judicial Behavior (Princeton 2006) (arguing that judicial behavior can be examined by
exploring judicial relationships with various audiences, including fellow judges and the
general public, but also including the social groups with which judges identify); Thomas
J. Miceli and Metin M. Coşgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J Econ Behav
& Org 31 (1994) (offering a model of judicial decisionmaking that includes a judge’s reputation as a factor).
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(p 19). Reputation in their theory captures not only the public’s
view of the judiciary (as a single court or as separate judges), but
also judges’ opinions of each other (p 23). Finally, reputation has
a coherent meaning that transcends state boundaries and cultures and operates across time.7 Judicial reputation is challenging
to define and even more difficult to measure. But this is the task
that the authors set for themselves.
We begin this Review by offering a description of the book. A
responsible book reviewer should, at a minimum, give the reader
a good feel for the authors’ project. Part I is not a substitute for
reading this fine book, but hopefully will facilitate a deeper reading of the book. We then move in Part II to our evaluation. We
find much to like in this book. But we also have questions about
the ability of the theory to hang together in a unified manner and
to do the work assigned to it. Part III considers what motivates
judges. Part IV suggests an alternative account.
I. THE CORE CLAIM
Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg begin their book with an
unusually valuable introduction to the substantive chapters
which follow. The introduction is framed by two (in)famous examples of judicial action: one that strengthened a court’s reputation
and one that damaged a court’s reputation. The book opens with
Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2012 Obamacare decision (pp 1–2).
Roberts not only joined the five-justice majority that upheld the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), but also
authored the Supreme Court’s opinion.8 Roberts’s policy preference, by any conventional measure, should have been to overturn
Obamacare (p 1). Thus, he must have chosen to vote against his
preferred outcome in the immediate case in order to achieve other
goals. Roberts’s actions appear to have strengthened the view of
the Court as independent and of himself as a statesman chief in
the model of Chief Justice John Marshall.9
7
Finding coherent meaning in any comparative scholarship poses many problems,
including very basic ones: What is a “court” and who is a “judge” for purposes of drawing
comparisons?
8
See generally National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct
2566 (2012).
9
See Adam Liptak, John Roberts Criticized Supreme Court Confirmation Process, before There Was a Vacancy (NY Times, Mar 21, 2016), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/us/politics/john-roberts-criticized-supreme-court-confirmation
-process-before-there-was-a-vacancy.html (visited Apr 29, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable)
(quoting Professor Akhil Amar’s assertion that by standing against the Senate’s opposition
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Garoupa and Ginsburg draw a sharp and deliberate contrast
with the sensational Italian murder trial of American exchange
student Amanda Knox for the killing of her roommate (p 5). The
Italian judiciary drew unwanted negative attention with its inconsistent rulings involving multiple courts, multiple trials, multiple findings of guilt, and ultimately a declaration of Knox’s innocence by the country’s highest court (p 5). The fallout from this
incident and Italy’s woeful position on a World Bank ranking and
other rankings of judicial quality (it fares worse than Haiti on at
least one measure) has included calls for serious reforms to the
Italian judicial system.10 Writing elsewhere, the authors warn that
“[a] judiciary with a poor reputation . . . will find itself starved of
both resources and respect” (p 15). The authors demonstrate that,
even in two different countries, two dramatically different kinds
of cases, and two starkly different court structures, judicial reputation matters. But how does it matter?
The authors argue that reputation is the joist in the construction of any judicial system and continues to play that central supporting role as courts operate and evolve (pp 7, 59–65,
188). A reputation-centered theory, therefore, can explain the
range of court structures seen throughout the United States and
the world (pp 28–44). Moreover, court structure itself influences
how courts are perceived (pp 9–10). The result is a feedback loop
between the judicial system and the internal and external perception of the system. In order to further this argument, the authors
propose a reputation theory of courts and then seek to empirically
test that theory (p 13).
A.

Theoretical Development

To build their theory, Garoupa and Ginsburg look to two wellestablished theories of political behavior generally and judicial behavior specifically: a political economy account and an institutional

to considering a nominee, Roberts would have a “John Marshall moment,” his “third extraordinary moment of . . . showing that he is no partisan,” his first two moments being his votes
to uphold Obamacare against two separate challenges).
10 See, for example, Italy’s Judicial System: Justice Denied? (The Economist, July
19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SCN2-8K2K (reporting on European Central Bank
President Mario Draghi’s call for reforms to the Italian civil justice system); Gianluca
Esposito, Sergi Lanau, and Sebastiaan Pompe, Judicial System Reform in Italy—a Key
to Growth *11–14 (IMF Working Paper No 14/32, Feb 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7SJX-ZBT5 (proposing various reforms to accelerate the pace of cases in
the Italian judicial system).
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account. The first substantive chapter—“A Theory of Judicial Reputation and Audiences”—explicitly lays out these theoretical foundations (pp 14–49). The later chapters do not consistently refer
back to this theoretical framework. But if reputation theory is indeed a theory (rather than a description), then the role of these two
grand theories is important to understand.
The political economy story begins with the familiar rational
actor. Judges are rational actors who make decisions that they
believe will maximize the probability of the attainment of their
ends (pp 22–23). Their goals include developing their reputations,
because reputation has an ultimate as well as an instrumental (or
intermediate) value. That is, judges, like other people, desire that
(certain) audiences view them favorably. All else constant, judges
will make a decision that improves their reputation over one that
worsens their reputation. Judges also understand that being held
in high esteem can help them attain other ends that they want
(pp 4–5). Thus, a good reputation is instrumentally valuable. The
idea of a judge as a rational maximizer is familiar to students of
judicial behavior.11
Garoupa and Ginsburg seek to stake out an original theory
by exploiting the principal-agent model in political economics
(pp 59–65).12 This model has been used regularly to evaluate the
structure of courts and the work of judges.13 But Garoupa and
Ginsburg recast the principal-agent framework by treating reputation as the critical “interaction of an agent and audiences” (or
principals) (p 6). To understand how this works, we review the
basic principal-agent model as applied to courts (pp 59–60). The
public wants disputes resolved and law made and/or interpreted.
To get those tasks accomplished, the public creates courts and assigns to those courts the responsibility to do this work. But, like
any principal who delegates responsibility to an agent, the public
worries that judges will act in their own interest, rather than in
the public’s interest. The public, however, has limited capacity to
11 See, for example, Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The
Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 29
(Harvard 2013) (describing the economic theory of judges as rational actors and explaining
how the authors’ work expands on this approach).
12 For an explanation of the role of the principal-agent model in the theory of political
actors and institutions, see Gary J. Miller, The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science, 35 J Econ Lit 1173, 1189–93 (1997); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of
Organization, 28 Am J Polit Sci 739, 756–58, 765–72 (1984).
13 For an early example, see generally Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, and
Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am J Polit Sci 673 (1994).
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directly monitor courts to ensure that judges behave properly
(p 15). Moreover, the public does not want (in an ex ante sense)
judges to be doing exactly what the public wants (in an ex post
sense), because a crucial element of good judicial behavior tends
to be judicial independence from public preferences. The design
problem, therefore, is that the system has to be set up so that
judges have incentives to behave in the manner that the public
wants, without the public being able to evaluate the decisions of
the judges, and without rewarding judges based on whether the
public likes the outcomes in those decisions or not (pp 60–61). The
solution judicial system designers have hit upon, Garoupa and
Ginsburg explain, is to create judicial accountability via what one
might call low-powered evaluations; that is judicial reputation—
“the stock of assessments about an actor’s past performance”
(p 15)—which serves as an accurate (or “noiseless”) indicator of
judicial quality (pp 23–24).14
Judicial reputation is complicated, however, by the context in
which it is created and experienced. The authors explain that reputation is both individual and collective (p 22). Individual reputation is held by the judge while collective reputation is held by
the court. However, the authors argue that individual reputation
and collective reputation are not independent because courts operate as teams (p 22). This team production feature ties the reputation of judges together. As the authors put it, the “size of the
pie to be divided among individual judges” is determined by collective reputation (p 23). As a result, judges care about both individual and collective reputation.
The principal-agent model explains why the principal—the
public—will rely on reputation to monitor judges. And it also accounts for why judges will be attentive to their personal reputations as well as to their courts’ reputations, because of the latter’s
role in the evaluation of the individual judge’s work (pp 24–25).
But the principal-agent model does not fully explain the system
of incentives and disincentives that also drives Garoupa and
Ginsburg’s reputation theory. In order to bring those into their
theory, the authors look to the role of institutional design (p 29).

14 A high-powered incentive system would be one in which the rewards for judges are
tied much more closely to their performance. For example, judges might get specific rewards based on whether the ruling elite liked their decisions in individual cases.
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The authors provide what can be characterized as a new institutional account.15
Institutional theory posits that individual behavior is a product of institutional constraints. Institutional structures impact
political behavior. Institutional theories of judicial behavior adopt
the rational actor assumption that judges seek to achieve their
individual preferences but argue that judges, in order to attain
their policy preferences, must and do consider the preferences and
likely actions of other relevant actors.16 Hence, institutional theorists emphasize the influence of strategic factors, such as interactions with other judges (internal dynamics)17 or reactions of external actors, most notably those with some power over judges’ work
(exogenous constraints).18
Garoupa and Ginsburg use the insights of institutional theory
to explain the dynamics surrounding certain judicial actions. For
example, the authors analyze the decision to dissent (pp 30–35). A
judge may dissent to gain individual reputation. But dissents can
be costly in terms of the effort required to write them and the possibility of creating friction with colleagues. Judges, therefore, will
be more likely to dissent when they may influence subsequent development of the law (p 31). But the dissent also poses costs within
the court and may even harm the court’s collective reputation as a
decisionmaking body. During Marshall’s leadership, the Supreme
Court wrote with a single voice in order to maximize the collective
reputation of the federal judiciary at a time when courts were not
held in high regard (pp 32–33). In Garoupa and Ginsburg’s account of separate opinion writing, judges use institutional design
governing separate opinions in order to maximize reputation

15 See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 Am Polit Sci Rev 734, 741–42 (1984) (describing individual behavior as “driven by rules within a political structure” and explaining the role of
“institutional rules”).
16 For a collection of institutional accounts of courts, see generally Cornell W. Clayton
and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches
(Chicago 1999).
17 See, for example, Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 Wash L Rev 213, 272–73 (1999) (concluding that an
appellate court’s decision to hear a case en banc is primarily influenced by factors internal
to the court system).
18 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal L Rev 613, 664–66 (1991) (discussing the dynamic interaction between the Supreme Court, the president, and Congress).
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(p 33).19 They offer a similar consideration of rules governing oral
argument, appeals, case selection, pay, judicial discipline, and
other basic features of courts (pp 29–44).
To summarize, the theoretical structure Garoupa and Ginsburg
posit is a dynamic one. On one side of the dynamic, the social planner sets up judicial institutions as a function of local contexts
(needs, preferences, capabilities, etc.) so that the desire for certain
types of reputation will push the agents within the system to work
effectively (p 49). On the flip side though, the types of reputations
that the judges already have and the degree to which they are
concerned about maintaining these reputations (and even improving them) will be crucial variables to help the social planner
determine which institutional structures are optimal.20
B.

Empirical Examination

The authors seek to demonstrate the role of reputation
through the different mechanisms theorized using political economic and institutional accounts. They explicate their theory by
applying it to a set of specific issues that most judicial systems
have to face, such as the extent to which judges should be permitted to take on nonjudicial roles (pp 75–97), the uses of judicial
merit commissions (pp 98–140), the effects of the increased globalization of law (pp 167–78), the proliferation of rankings of the
rule of law (pp 175–78), and the interaction of courts within a
country (pp 141–66). The tools used to explore the issues they flag
largely fall into the category of case studies.
Legal scholarship is principally motivated by a desire to situate individual cases selected based on some shared characteristic into a coherent argument. In the current book, the cases do
essentially the same work. Garoupa and Ginsburg begin their first
substantive chapter with the US Supreme Court decision in 2000
that decided the presidential election between then-Governor
George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore (p 14). They note Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s subsequent assessment that the
Court should have stayed out of the process because of the harm
19 For a similar conception of separate opinions, see, for example, Virginia A. Hettinger,
Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on
Federal Appellate Decision Making 109–17 (Virginia 2006).
20 See, for example, pp 17, 49, 74 (noting both that the structures of institutions impact the texture of reputation that is generated within them and that the type of reputation that a system already has—and the preferences of the judges within it—impacts
choices about modifications that need to be made to the system).

11 GULATI&GEORGE_BKR_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Courts of Good and Ill Repute

9/20/2016 2:26 PM

1691

the decision did to the Court’s reputation (p 14). Like the Obamacare decision and the Knox trial, Bush v Gore21 is only one of a
number of individual cases used by the authors to support their
arguments, but it is the best suited to their theory. And it shows
the value of using individual cases to explain difficult concepts
and persuade the audience. But the choice of case also reveals
how the American judicial system—in particular federal courts
and, even more specifically, the US Supreme Court—frames the
reputation theory here even as the authors strive for a comparative theory.
Garoupa and Ginsburg undertake a comparative institutional analysis to separate out the effects of individual reputation
from the effects of collective reputation on courts. They argue that
“career” judiciaries emphasize collective reputation whereas
“recognition” judiciaries emphasize individual reputation (pp 29–
30). The form of judiciary influences the structure of the judicial
system, which in turn reinforces the type of reputation that dominates. To understand how this works, the authors compare the
United States and Japan, which have historically selected judges
in very different ways, reflecting cultural and political differences
between the countries and sharply different judicial practices
(pp 44–48). Japan has a career judiciary reflecting cultural norms
favoring collective quality over individual status. The Japanese
career system is bureaucratic, selects its members at a young age
when they do not have strong outside reputations of their own,
and thereafter deemphasizes individuality and hence individual
reputation (p 45). And Japanese court practices also favor collective reputation by relying on unsigned opinions and rotating assignments such that judges (as opposed to courts) have little
meaningful external identity (p 45). The United States, by contrast, has relied on a “recognition system” of judicial selection, according to Garoupa and Ginsburg; that is, judges are chosen in
recognition of individual accomplishment (pp 44–45). All of the
many methods of judicial selection in the American states are
based on a concept of individual merit, whether evaluated by voters at the polls, elected officials at appointment, or a merit commission on selection (pp 44–45). American judges often have significant reputations even before they take on their judicial roles
and subsequently sign opinions, are visible in media coverage of

21 531 US 98 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s order allowing a manual
recount in the 2000 presidential election).
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cases, and stake out specific positions in their rulings and public
appearances (pp 44–45). Interestingly, both countries have in recent years experienced a shift in which American judges are increasingly on a judicial career path22 and Japanese judges are increasingly identified based on external evaluation (pp 47–48).
The usual explanation for whether countries have a recognition or career judiciary is history or “tradition.” The authors challenge the legal-tradition narrative by examining judicial “pockets”—exceptions to the general system in place in a specific
jurisdiction (pp 50–53, 59). The presence of outliers undermines
the historical inevitability at the heart of the legal-tradition account. France is a civil-law system that has a career judiciary. But
its commercial courts are staffed by elected lay people (p 55). The
United States is a common-law system that has a recognition judiciary. But its administrative law and military judges represent
a career judiciary operating like the system in Japan (pp 57–58).
These exceptions not only undercut legal-tradition theory, they
also demonstrate the explanatory power of the principal-agent
model when applied to courts (pp 59–65). Career judiciaries are
better suited to administrative adjudication, in which the principal concern is moral hazard (p 62). Constitutional adjudication is
better served by recognition judiciaries, because judges are chosen based on proxies for the judges’ preferences (and their alignment with society’s preferences) and judges disclose more information about their preferences (initially) and about their
decisions (subsequently) (pp 54, 61).
In the US federal system and nearly all American states, a
single court serves as the court of last resort in the jurisdiction
and has both constitutional and nonconstitutional authority
(p 147). By contrast, many other countries have constitutional
courts separate from their courts of last resort (p 141). The constitutional court is staffed by politically appointed judges, while
law courts are staffed by career judges (pp 53–54). That method
of selection is consistent with the principal-agent account discussed above. But that account does not consider the interaction
between the two high courts and their competition for jurisdiction
and power. Reputation theory hypothesizes that the two high
courts, even though they are in the same country, will develop
different procedures and norms. For example, the constitutional
22 One indication of this is the increasing tendency in the US federal courts to make
promotions, and particularly so vis-à-vis the high court, from within the system. See, for example, Epstein, Landes, and Posner, Behavior of Federal Judges at 337–41 (cited in note 11).
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court will be more fragmented, with separate opinions and an emphasis on individual reputation, while the supreme court will be
more uniform, operating by consensus and creating collective reputation (pp 146–49). The authors capitalize on the differences to
examine the interaction between constitutional courts and supreme courts within twenty-two countries that have both
(pp 154–74). They find that the greater the disagreement within
a constitutional court, the higher the probability of conflict between the constitutional court and the supreme court (p 155).
While the sample size is admittedly too small to draw strong conclusions, the authors strengthen their claim of a causal relationship by focusing on specific instances of conflict (pp 156–64).
Most judicial systems, and perhaps all, constrain judges from
engaging in at least some nonjudicial activities (p 76). This constraint, the authors argue, can be understood from the perspective of reputational theory. Judiciaries, the argument goes, build
reputations over time—specifically, reputations for matters such
as impartiality, honesty, and the ability to sort out complicated
facts and get close to the truth (p 81). Actors outside the judiciary,
then, have an incentive to see whether they can take advantage
of this built-up reputation for their nonjudicial purposes, by hiring the judges for jobs that require a credible signal of matters
such as honesty and credibility (p 83). These jobs can include
things such as running private arbitration, being on a board of
directors, serving on an investigative commission, and even taking high political office (p 79). The risk that the foregoing poses,
though, is that judges will undermine the carefully and painstakingly built reputation of the judicial system by pursuing private
gain that takes advantage of what is supposed to be a public good
(pp 82–83). And that, the authors argue, is why judicial systems
around the globe tend to constrain nonjudicial activities (pp 76–
78, 96–97).
C.

Prescriptions

Garoupa and Ginsburg embrace the responsibility to make
meaningful policy recommendations based on what they have
learned about how courts function. Their commitment to normative relevance is one of the many strengths of their book. Their
approach to understanding courts informs their prescriptions.
They contend that we can improve our courts by simultaneously
incentivizing strong individual performance and encouraging effective collaboration (pp 188–97).
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Garoupa and Ginsburg mention several possible reforms that
would induce greater individual effort, including variable pay,
transparency, and a market for judges (pp 191–93). “In an ideal
world,” they say, “we would compensate judges for their marginal
contribution to judicial reputation” (p 190). But variable compensation has several theoretical as well as proven difficulties. Measuring an individual judge’s performance is the most obvious challenge, but probably not the most difficult. As we have seen in other
settings, pay for performance can undermine contributions to team
effort and erode professionalism (pp 190–91). And, despite some
apparent success in a limited, historical setting in England, payfor-performance efforts in other countries have been heavily criticized (pp 190–91). While acknowledging these issues, Garoupa
and Ginsburg make a plea for more study of how compensation
structures can encourage healthy competition (p 192). They also
suggest that jurisdictions should consider allowing direct competition among judges. Judges could, for example, be allowed to advertise their relative virtues to forum-shopping parties (p 192).
Courts could also create special panels or assignments for which
judges could compete internally (pp 192–93). We already see this
practice in the United States, where, for example, federal judges
position themselves for selection as a transferee judge in multidistrict litigation23 or as a member of a special assignment court
or judicial conference committee.24
The authors also weigh possible reforms for inducing greater
collective effort, including random de novo appeal (pp 193–94), a
transnational market for judges (pp 194–95), enhanced judicial
disciplinary systems (“[c]leaning [h]ouse”) (pp 195–96), and active
management of the media (pp 196–97). Random audits are routinely done across industries and activities. The authors argue
that even though they can find no record of its use in courts, random de novo review of a sample of cases could serve much the
same purpose in the judicial system as it serves elsewhere (p 194).
They also consider the suggestion of Professors Jens Dammann
and Henry Hansmann that, in essence, justice-rich countries
should be able to rent their judges to justice-poor countries
23 See Margaret S. Williams and Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil
Litigation? The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J Empirical Legal Stud 424, 440, 449–57 (2013).
24 See generally Tracey E. George and Margaret S. Williams, Venue Shopping: The
Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 97 Judicature 196 (2014);
Dawn M. Chutkow, The Chief Justice as Executive: Judicial Conference Committee Appointments, 2 J L & Cts 301 (2014).
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(p 194).25 This would create a global market for courts, in which
adjudication is the product and reputation is the measure of
value. The benefits could be similar to those gained from open
borders for other types of products.
In sum, the authors contend that reputation is a positive aspect of judicial institutions because reputation allows judges to
provide information to audiences and allows outsiders to monitor
judges (pp 187–88). Therefore, greater transparency, strong judicial disciplinary systems, and competition among judges would be
beneficial as they would allow more information about the quality
of judges and courts to be shared and create greater confidence in
courts themselves.
II. EVALUATING AND TESTING THE CORE CLAIM
The authors’ core argument, as we see it, has three crucial
steps. First, judicial systems need to have a high reputation in
order to function effectively because judges will, for many of their
most important decisions, lack police or military power to ensure
enforcement of their dictates (p 3). Or, even if they have access to
military or police power, they will risk losing it to the extent they
are prosecuting the people with authority over those branches of
the state.26 Second, the type of system—whether it emphasizes individual judicial reputations, collective ones, or some hybrid—
that will generate the kind of reputation that the state in question
needs will differ depending on context (pp 16–17). And, finally, social planners (who represent the populace), understanding these
considerations, will make choices about how to structure their judicial systems as a function of what type of reputation is needed to
maximize social welfare at any given point in time (p 17).
Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg’s claim is a departure from
how most scholars think about the structural features of judiciaries, which is primarily as a function of historical happenstance at
the starting point eons ago and inertia for the many intervening
decades since then (p 18). Change, to the extent it ever occurs, is
glacial. Historical origins, inertia, and path dependence, though,
are but bit players in the story that Garoupa and Ginsburg tell;
25 See generally Jens Dammann and Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 Cornell L Rev 1 (2008).
26 The ongoing prosecutions of key members of the ruling political party in Brazil,
driven largely by the efforts of a single judge, are a vivid illustration of this tension. See
Bruce Douglas and Sam Cowie, Brazil: Judge Halts Lula’s Appointment to Cabinet amid
Corruption Scandal (The Guardian, Mar 17, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/76UF-7V72.
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for them, the structures of judiciaries can and should be primarily
understood through a functional lens—specifically, the lens of
maximizing the type of reputation the judicial system in question
most needs (pp 8–9).
Garoupa and Ginsburg deserve enormous credit for advancing a new paradigm—that judicial institutions around the world
are structured and modified largely as a function of their needs
for particular types of reputation—and calling into question the
legal origins or path-dependence school of thought. And even if
one does not buy their theoretical frame one bit, their book is a
delightful read in terms of its thick description of the various
characteristics of judicial systems around the world. The discussions in the chapters on judges engaging in nonjudicial activities
(pp 75–97), the varying uses of judicial councils (pp 98–140), the
reasons for the rise and proliferation of constitutional courts
(pp 141–66), the increasing relevance of cross-country rankings of
judicial quality (pp 167–86), and the varying uses of modern media to brand the court system (pp 196–97) are all gems in their
own right. Further, the book is full of rich country-specific descriptions from Japan, Spain, Italy, Canada, Pakistan, and more
that will be new to many readers (most were new to us).
Being academics, we of course have our quibbles, but they are
more accurately put as requests to the authors that they consider
explicating and extending their work in certain directions that
might help further their project.
A.

A Fuller Theory, Please

Where the book falls short for us is in failing to articulate a
theoretical frame strong enough to generate a wide range of testable hypotheses. To be fair, Garoupa and Ginsburg are clear in
their introduction that they are not setting out a testable theory;
instead, theirs is more of a description (p 13). But to give them a
pass on that would be too easy, especially because they have an
intriguing theoretical claim and it should be possible to articulate
it in a parsimonious-enough fashion such that it can be subject to
testing. As we see it, the theory could be sharpened on two definitional fronts: (1) the meaning of reputation within the Garoupa
and Ginsburg framework; and (2) how it varies (in terms of what
type is needed) by context.
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1. Theorizing reputation.
Garoupa and Ginsburg state at the outset that reputation is
“the stock of judgments about an actor’s past behavior” (p 4). But
judgments about what? And whose judgments? A court that
builds the right kind of reputation, Garoupa and Ginsburg explain, is more effective—it has greater credibility and its dictates
are followed (pp 2, 16). And one can imagine a self-fulfilling dynamic in which courts that have high reputations can do their
work with less and less need for monitoring and policing expense
and take more risks with their decisions in trying to make rules
that improve social welfare, which all in turn enables even better
and cheaper decisionmaking (and ultimately puts the system on a
high-growth path). But we cannot test the Garoupa and Ginsburg
claim unless they provide a measurable definition of reputation
(which in turn would require defining the relevant audience
whose judgments are to be measured).27 And this, we think,
should not be an impossible task—particularly given the theoretical claims being made about the importance of reputation in determining the effectiveness of judicial systems. We note two reasons why below.
First, take the theoretical claim about the importance of reputation. There is a well-established literature from scholars like
Professors Lisa Bernstein,28 Robert Ellickson,29 Avner Greif,30
Barak Richman,31 and others on how, in certain contexts, formal
legal sanctions and top-down monitoring can be unnecessary because of the effective operation of nonlegal sanctions. These stories are, in effect, stories about how reputation-based systems can
work effectively. And, as we see it, Garoupa and Ginsburg are in
effect making the argument that reputation can play a similar
role within judicial systems (albeit on a far larger scale than any
of the aforementioned authors tried). The key to all of those stories of the effective operation of reputation in holding a system
together, though, was the high quality of information that was
27 Garoupa and Ginsburg are explicit about not wanting to specify a core reputation
function (p 16).
28 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001).
29 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property
Rights around the Hearth, 116 Yale L J 226 (2006).
30 See generally Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence
on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J Econ Hist 857 (1989).
31 See generally Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 J L & Soc Inquiry 383 (2006).
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available to all the relevant players.32 And, logically we think, if
there is high-quality information available to all, then reputation
should be measurable. Or, put differently, for a reputation-based
system to work effectively, participants have to be able to calculate reputation. And that in turn should mean that it is easily
measurable, at least for local participants, and, therefore, perhaps even for external observers. In small communities of traders, for example, one indicator of an individual’s loss of reputation
is often the refusal of others to trade with that person or to engage
in large (valuable) trades with her.33 Or it might be something
more idiosyncratic, such as the denial of entry into the local temple.34 For small groups in which reputation matters crucially for
the internal sanction mechanisms to work, it has to be possible
for members of the group to easily identify those who have lost
reputation (and conversely those who have gained it). Likewise,
if reputation is crucial to the operation of courts, then judges (and
interested local audiences such as lawyers and politicians) must
be able to evaluate changes in a judge’s reputation.
Second, as a positive matter, the most common kind of reputation Garoupa and Ginsburg seem to be talking about—the one
that gives courts legitimacy in the eyes of the public—is of the
kind that comes from being willing to stop the state from harming
those who lack power.35 This is a measurable characteristic. If the
populace has good information about whether their judiciary is
likely to stop those in the executive branch or the military from
32 The literature in question is too large to justify citing all of its key pieces. For an
overview of the relevant dynamics, though, see, for example, Barak D. Richman, Firms,
Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104
Colum L Rev 2328, 2333–37 (2004).
33 See Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 1764 (cited in note 28) (noting that “breach of
contract as to one transactor is transformed into breach of contract as to numerous market
transactors for the purposes of a transactor’s commercial reputation”).
34 See, for example, Richman, 31 J L & Soc Inquiry at 407 n 59 (cited in note 31).
35 Although the example above is that of the judiciary standing up to the state in a
manner that is welfare enhancing, there can also be instances in which the judiciary tries
to block state action in a fashion that is welfare reducing. The actions of the US Supreme
Court in the so-called Lochner (pre–New Deal) era are seen by many as such a case. For a
description, see generally Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s
Great Supreme Court Justices (Twelve 2010). More generally, there is a large literature on
what kind of judicial behavior vis-à-vis the government in power gives the judiciary legitimacy in the eyes of the public (and therefore power of its own). See, for example, Georg
Vanberg, Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment, 18
Ann Rev Polit Sci 167, 179–81 (2015) (discussing the role of strategic judicial behavior in
interactions with other branches of government); Rafael La Porta, et al, Judicial Checks
and Balances, 112 J Polit Econ 445, 457–58, 468 (2004) (analyzing the link between judicial independence, constitutional review, and economic freedom).
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overreaching their authority, and is confident in that belief, that
should be measurable via surveys—after all, the claim is that populations do have this kind of information and that their having
this kind of information matters for the effective working of the
system. Further, if one wanted to get more fine-grained, one could
try to measure public perceptions of the quality of decisionmaking, which would include matters such as speed of disputation, as
well—and this also seems to be important to the Garoupa and
Ginsburg analysis (pp 23, 187–88). The quality of decisionmaking
of courts or judges could be, and is already, measured in a variety
of ways (citations to decisions by other courts, surveys of litigants,
and so on).36 The bottom line is that a sharper definition of reputation is necessary, even if multiple kinds of reputation need to be
specified. That in turn will enable testing, something that Garoupa
and Ginsburg presumably want for their ambitious theory.
2. Describing the boxes.
Assuming now that Garoupa and Ginsburg were to clarify the
different kinds of reputations that they have in mind and how to
measure them, the next specification question in their model is
which types of contexts require which types of reputation. This
second specification is needed because the core of the Garoupa
and Ginsburg claim is that judicial structures are (1) initially chosen and (2) subsequently modified over time as a function of the
system’s need for different types of reputation (pp 50–53). The response that Garoupa and Ginsburg might give is that the answer
depends on context, and that different social, economic, and political contexts require the relevant judiciaries to pursue different
types of reputations (pp 17–18, 189). But surely Garoupa and
Ginsburg can give us some boxes or broad categorizations.
For example, do countries or regions with highly educated
and secular populations, and with income levels above a certain
amount, tend to find judiciaries more legitimate if they provide
their judgments in individualized and nuanced ways? Would, for
example, a 5–4 decision of the type that was handed down in Bush
have undermined confidence in the judiciary to a sufficient extent
to cause a structural breakdown if it had happened in a different
context than the United States in 2000? Similarly, perhaps there
36 There is a growing, albeit still small, literature on measuring judges and justice.
See Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky and Jonathan L. Williams, Note, Foreword: Measuring
Judges and Justice, 58 Duke L J 1173, 1175–79 (2009) (describing empirical research on
judges and judicial decisionmaking).
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is a set of conditions under which Garoupa and Ginsburg would
predict that a population would give more legitimacy points to a
judiciary that provides collectivized decisions, without any nuance or dissension, than it would to a judiciary that showed dissension among the individual judges. They seem to hint as much,
to our reading, but do not sketch out the categories or boxes of
circumstances.
Once those different boxes or sets of stylized circumstances
are set forth, Garoupa and Ginsburg could then explain, drawing
from their theory, why those particular contexts call for particular
types of reputation-generating structures. For example, is there
a prediction regarding the kind of reputation a judicial system
needs in a newly formed nation that has not inherited, from its
prior incarnation, well-established institutions? And does this
need vary as a function of the degree of overall wealth or wealth
disparities or racial and ethnic diversity in a society?
Another set of factors that might impact an audience’s interpretation of a court’s decision has to do with the structural features of the court. Garoupa and Ginsburg, as we read them, would
say that an individualistic system like the US Supreme Court will
produce a different level of reputation than a collective system
like the European Court of Justice (pp 28–44, 180–81). At first
cut, this seems intuitively right. There are surely going to be situations—for example, when the court is telling the public that the
government in question is illegitimate and needs to leave office
because the evidence shows that it rigged elections—in which the
public would like the members of the court (regardless of political
preferences) to speak with one voice. And in a context in which
these kinds of decisions need to be made frequently by the judiciary (perhaps a country with a weak rule-of-law culture and a high
level of governmental corruption), one might jump to the conclusion that the judiciary should be constrained to speak with one
voice. However, if one scratches the surface, it is not clear that
that is the case.
Take a court whose judges often disagree and speak separately, with starkly differing views. If and when these judges are
in unanimity about something, the public will notice—and particularly so if it is a matter of great public importance (like the need
to throw out an illegitimate government). But is the public going
to notice, or take any special meaning, from the fact that the
judges are speaking in unison if the rules require that they do?
We suspect that the message—and the reputational impact—of a
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court’s members speaking in unison will be close to zero if the
court is mandated to speak with a single voice. Indeed, the differential reputational value of speaking in unison versus individually probably occurs only in systems in which the judges have the
option to do either. In that context, the choice that the judges
make sends a message. If the judges have no choice, then there is
no message from the choice to speak with one voice.
And even if a court were speaking in unison in a context in
which the judges have the option to speak individually, it is by no
means clear what the message would be. Dissenting requires effort cost. Overworked courts lack time and enthusiasm for extra
work. Thus, busy judges will write fewer dissents than nonbusy
judges regardless of the level of underlying disagreement in their
respective courts.37 In the context of a judiciary that is overburdened with work, speaking in unison might just be an indicator of
the fact that the judges cannot handle their work as a group and
have just agreed to agree even when they disagree so that the work
can get handled more effectively. In the high-workload context,
though, the occasions when the judges speak individually could
plausibly be interpreted by their audiences as more meaningful.
The point of the foregoing is that unless one has a theory of
why and how the relevant audience interprets judicial or court
behavior, one cannot build a meaningful theory of judicial reputation—at least not one that is amenable to empirical testing. We
want more meat on the bones of the core Garoupa and Ginsburg
theory in order to run a horse race between it and the historical
origins or inertia theory in terms of which one can better predict
what we see in judicial systems around the world. More than
that, it would help to understand how and why the Garoupa and
Ginsburg theory is different from existing institutional theories
of judicial behavior and structures.38 Institutional analysis of the
kind articulated by Professors Lee Epstein and Jack Knight in
their classic book, The Choices Justices Make, would likely explain Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act in very much the same manner that Garoupa and
Ginsburg do in their opening two pages: as a strategic decision

37 For an analysis of the relationship between workload and dissent rates, see generally Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J Legal Analysis 101 (2011).
38 Garoupa and Ginsburg describe their work as fitting within the institutionalanalysis rubric (p 7). Their modification of the standard model, though, is emphasizing
the paramount importance of reputation.
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born out of a concern about preserving the court’s position vis-àvis the other branches of government and the public (pp 1–2).39
The difference between the Epstein and Knight variety of institutional theory and the Garoupa and Ginsburg version, though, as
we understand it, is the emphasis that Garoupa and Ginsburg put
on reputation. But the two sets of theories are indistinguishable
unless Garoupa and Ginsburg provide a sharper and more precise
definition of reputation that shows how their theory explains and
predicts in a different fashion from the more traditional institutional analysis.
Below, we try to set out some ways in which the theory might
be better specified and tested. First though, we think there is another gap in the theoretical frame that needs to be filled: the question of judicial motivation within the model.
B.

Where Are the Judges (and What Motivates Them)?

Missing from the Garoupa and Ginsburg framework is a
theory of judicial behavior and, in particular, a story about what
motivates judges to pursue reputation at an individual level. (And
this is where we need to know more about what reputation is.)
This is a significant gap in their story because most judicial systems around the world, almost by definition, need to be given a
significant degree of independence and discretion (effectively,
protection from oversight). The flip side of independence, however, is that judges have considerable room to misbehave. But assuming—we think plausibly—that they do not misbehave, at
least not to the same extent that most people probably would if
given that level of job security, there is a puzzle: Why do judges
work as much and as well as they do, given that they have considerable leeway to shirk and misbehave?
When we began reading Garoupa and Ginsburg, we thought
that maybe they were going to use the desire for reputation as the
key to explaining why judges behave well, despite the relative
lack of constraints on them. The reason this is important, given
their claims about the overall importance of reputation as a driving force for judicial system design, is that their system depends

39 See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 138–39 (CQ 1998).
For an explication of the Epstein and Knight model of judicial behavior, which views
judges as acting strategically in response to a variety of audiences who have power over
them while also seeking to advance personal policy preferences, see Frank B. Cross, Book
Review, The Justices of Strategy, 48 Duke L J 511, 511–31 (1998).
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on the individual actors within it acting in the pursuit of reputation (either individualistic or collective), without significant carrots or sticks to make them do that. So, for their overall claims to
be plausible, they need to tell a persuasive story about why it is
not only in the interest of the system designers to structure judicial institutions to generate reputation, but why it is plausible to
think that the soldiers within these institutions (the judges) will
act in ways that help achieve the system designers’ goals.
Our pointing out this gap in the analysis is meant as a
friendly amendment. As a starting point, it is not plausible to us
that judges might be more motivated by reputation than most of
the rest of us. That is, such a claim is not plausible unless a good
case could be made that social planners had constructed judicialselection systems to select individuals who would not only be intrinsically motivated, but also motivated by the pursuit of reputation. And this cannot be any reputation, but the kind of reputation for high-legitimacy or high-quality decisionmaking that
Garoupa and Ginsburg are positing. If this is plausible though,
that would put the onus on Garoupa and Ginsburg to delve deeper
into judicial-selection systems and tell a plausible story about
how these systems operate in a manner consistent with their reputation story.
So, if one takes the different US states that have considerable
variation in terms of how they select local judges (elections, merit selection, and a range of structures in between) (pp 100–01), Garoupa
and Ginsburg should be able to tell a story for (1) the differences
in the types of reputations different states might need as a function
of context, and (2) why the variation in judicial-selection systems
within the United States helps produce those different types of reputation. And then, even better, they should be able to show that
when the context within a state changes (for example, when a state
goes from having a relatively racially homogeneous population
with an agricultural base for its economy to a relatively racially
diverse population that has technology as its economic core), the
judicial-selection systems also change.40
As noted earlier, though, Garoupa and Ginsburg’s theoretical
frame will need to be better specified for it to be used in a horse
40 Garoupa and Ginsburg hint at being able to tell such an evolutionary story in their
discussion of how the norms of the US Supreme Court have fluctuated over time from
being individualistic (seriatim opinions initially) to collective (the norm against individual
opinions under Chief Justice Marshall) and then back to more individual opinions (under
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone) (pp 32–33).
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race against the standard inertia explanation for why state judicial systems are the way they are.
C.

A Possible Testing Ground

Garoupa and Ginsburg present the US federal judiciary as
the paradigm of an individualized judiciary and compare it to the
more bureaucratized judicial systems in much of the rest of the
world (p 28). We have no complaint with that perspective; one of
the best aspects of the book for those of us who focus mostly on
the US judicial system is the exposure to an analysis of a number
of foreign legal systems by two leading comparatists. What we
want to suggest, though, is that Garoupa and Ginsburg’s model
might be usefully tested, and perhaps pushed further, if it were
to be applied to a part of the US judiciary that goes largely unmentioned in their book—the state judicial systems.
In the frame of Garoupa and Ginsburg’s book, the US federal
judiciary sits at the highly individualized end of a continuum that
has career judiciaries, such as those in France and Japan, at the
other end (p 28). But the spectrum can perhaps be extended in the
other direction as well. Specifically, if compared to the US state
judicial system, in which judges in many states are elected, the
US federal judiciary looks to be more of a careerist or bureaucratic
system (pp 100–01). After all, a judge who has to individually
stand for election every few years has to make sure to develop a
very different type of reputation with the voting public (arguably,
a thicker and more locally oriented reputation) than a federal
judge who for the most part will be largely unknown by the local
public. The question, then, is whether Garoupa and Ginsburg’s
functional theory can help explain why different states in the
United States have their particular elected, quasi-elected, or nonelected judicial systems. If it can, Garoupa and Ginsburg will
have exploded a standard assumption regarding the reason for
why so many states in the United States have elected or quasielected judiciaries, which is that they are a product of a populist
move in the early days of the nation and that once the structure
was set it was extremely difficult to change.41
The foregoing assumption is one that many in the large literature on elected versus appointed judiciaries are particularly fond
41 Historical facts, of course, suggest a story that is more complicated that the simple
populism or history explanation. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am J Legal Hist 190,
203–10 (1993).
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of for perhaps functional reasons. For those on the policy side,
who are writing diatribes about why elected and quasi-elected judiciaries are obviously bad, the claim that these were the product
of some bizarre historical anomaly is convenient in that it fits the
claim that no one in their right mind would ever want an elected
judiciary.42 Academic empiricists studying the age-old question
whether elected or appointed judiciaries are best for society are, for
their part, also fond of this assumption because it means they can
assume that the state system in question was put in place independent of any functional reason (therefore enabling them to justify not having to do empirical corrections for the dreaded endogeneity problem).43 For our purposes, what the foregoing means is
that if Garoupa and Ginsburg (or their successors) can show that
the functional explanation better explains why state systems are
the way they are, that will call into question a whole host of empirical studies of the state judiciaries in the United States. And that
would be quite exciting. And as an aside, we suspect that a deeper
understanding of the state systems might be arrived at if examined
through Garoupa and Ginsburg’s functional lens. That lens says
that if one looks closely enough at the various judicial systems that
are supposed to be structured the way they are because of historical happenstance combined with inertia (pp 7–8), one can detect
equally, if not more, plausible functional explanations.
III. MOTIVATING THE JUDGES (AND DOING IT BETTER)
Given the story that Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg tell
about how social planners design judicial institutions to pursue
reputation, they need to also tell a story of why it is plausible to
think that the key actors in their play, the judges, will cooperate
in this pursuit of reputation. And this story has to come in two
parts. In the individualistic systems, judges need an incentive to
pursue their own personal reputations, whereas in the collective
systems, judges need incentives to pursue the enhancement of the
42 See Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol 67,
71, 88–96 (2009) (noting that “[t]he type of system a state has depends largely on the date
it adopted that system” and critiquing election systems in favor of merit selection systems).
43 See, for example, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Professionals
or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J L Econ & Org 290, 303 (2010) (noting in the description of an empirical study of
appointed versus elected judges that “the selection mechanism long predates our data pool
and thus mitigates concerns about endogeneity—that states adopted new mechanisms in
response to changes in judicial quality”). See also generally Alexander Tabarrok and Eric
Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J L & Econ 157 (1999).
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system’s reputation and put their self-enhancement aside. The
question then is whether we think it plausible that judges in either system will act in these manners.
The rub here is that there does not seem to be, in either system, a clearly identifiable set of rewards that go to judges from
their bosses as a reward for pursuing the relevant kind of reputation that is needed. And this is because judging, the world over,
is almost always designed as a kind of priesthood. To become a
judge is, for the most part, a decision to abdicate being incentivized by the things that motivate the rest of us at our jobs—more
income and more opportunities for leisure.44 In theory, the judges
in both systems could be motivated by the prospect of promotions
to higher-status jobs.45 But, as best we can tell, there is no judicial
system that Garoupa and Ginsburg have identified that makes
promotions clearly and identifiably a function of the work that the
judges do on the reputational front.46
For the judges in Garoupa and Ginsburg’s model to be pursuing reputation, either the individualistic or collective version, the
incentives need to be intrinsic (or inculcated). And that then leads
to the question whether we think it plausible that either the individualistic or collective system selects or socializes judges to pursue the relevant kinds of reputation. We briefly take each system
in turn.

44 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ Rev 1, 2 (1993) (exploring “how to explain judicial behavior in
economic terms, when almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and
other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incentives—to take away the carrots and sticks . . . that determine human action in an economic
model”).
45 Some of these basic ideas on the economics of judging are discussed in Russell
Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus and, If So, Can We Measure Their Performance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 Fla St U L Rev 1299
(2005). For examples of papers conjecturing that reputational concerns motivate judges
and/or those with power over their careers, see generally Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and
the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J Econ 275 (2005); Eli Salzberger and Paul Fenn, Judicial
Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J L & Econ 831 (1999);
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J L & Econ 249 (1976).
46 What we mean here is a reputation for high-quality work—the kind of reputation
that the principal in the principal-agent relationship would want. We do not mean a reputation for being willing to advance the policy agenda of some politician. The latter, one
could argue, is indeed the kind of reputation that probably does result in advancement in
the US federal court system. For an argument that courts should, as a normative matter,
be designed to incentivize judges to pursue the former and not the latter, see generally
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 Cal L Rev 299 (2004).
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Plausibility of the Garoupa and Ginsburg Claim

The individualistic system, of which the US federal judiciary
is the prime example that Garoupa and Ginsburg use, typically
selects judges from the practicing bar at more advanced ages, after these individuals have already been lawyers for a number of
years (pp 44–45). If the goal was to have a set of judges who would
embark on the pursuit of individual reputation of the type that
Garoupa and Ginsburg posit, it would have to be that the selection system was designed to identify and select the types of individuals who were already predisposed to pursue judicial superstardom (regardless of whether it was plausible for them to
achieve it). So, the question then is whether the US federal system, Garoupa and Ginsburg’s exemplar, is designed to select individuals of this type. We would like to think so—to think that
the politicians doing the selection are looking to select those who
will pursue reputation—and certainly there have been some exemplars such as Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Judge Richard Posner,
Judge Henry Friendly, Judge Frank Easterbrook, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and a handful of others. And Garoupa and
Ginsburg suggest that this is indeed the system we have; they
see the structural feature of choosing lawyers who are midway
through their legal careers as indicative of a system that seeks
out the star lawyers to then make judges (pp 9, 14, 29). But as
two researchers who have spent a great deal of time interviewing
and studying data on US federal judges, we suspect that our politicians are not at all looking to select judges of the Cardozo, Posner,
and Friendly type. They are the aberrations, who somehow got
through the selection process almost by mistake. Politicians, if
anything, do not seem to like them very much precisely because
they have pursued judicial stardom and not the interests of the
politicians (put differently, they turned out to be too damn independent and too damn smart).47 Most judges on the federal bench,

47 The research on this question is thin, but what little there is does not seem to
suggest that politicians selecting judges are looking for stars (either in terms of their willingness to stand up to the government, their independence from political influence, or the
quality of their decisions). See, for example, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A.
Posner, The Role of Competence in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts, 44 J Legal
Stud S107, S129 (2015) (“[P]residents do not seem interested in promoting the district
judges with the highest competence.”); Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice
Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU Ann Surv Am L 19, 42–43 (2005) (“We suspect
that Posner himself does not think that he should be on the Supreme Court. . . . [It] is a
highly political body.”).
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we suspect, care very little about building their individual reputations in a Cardozo-Friendly-Posner fashion; they are happy to
do a good job, but they are not pursuing individual stardom.
Moving to the collective-reputation systems, which we readily admit we know a lot less about than the US federal system, we
suspect that the view of judges as pursuing their reputation in
some other-regarding or altruistic fashion is even more implausible. In these systems, Garoupa and Ginsburg explain, selection to
the judiciary tends to be at a young age, and then judges become
cogs in a big bureaucratic system (p 29). Nothing that we know
about the selection systems used around the world tells us that
the individuals selected tend to be particularly other-regarding.
Nor do we know of any plausible accounts of how these systems
succeed in socializing the judges at a young age to be altruistic in
terms of pursuing the system’s collective needs and abnegating
their own needs for self-advancement. That is, there are no plausible accounts unless the systems are designed to identify and reward the generation of collective reputation by individual
judges—but we have seen no claim to that effect.
Garoupa and Ginsburg pose their inquiry as a positive one;
they are investigating why judiciaries are structured the way
they are and not whether they should be structured in one way or
the other (pp 7, 14–19). But we read an undertone of approval
from Garoupa and Ginsburg for judicial systems that are designed to pursue reputation. Elsewhere in this Review, we have
tried to push Garoupa and Ginsburg on their positive claims. But
even if the positive claims turn out to be theoretically flawed
(maybe judicial systems are not designed to ensure the optimal
amount of reputation), Garoupa and Ginsburg, in their final chapter, do raise the question of whether social planners in the future
might do well to consider reputation enhancement when they design new structures (pp 187–97). Certainly, the two of us accept
the argument that a judiciary that has a high reputation will be
more effective and that social planners should keep reputation
generation in mind when designing judicial institutions and selecting judges. But we are skeptical that they do that very much
currently, anywhere.
B.

Making It Happen

Garoupa and Ginsburg suggest some intriguing and creative
possibilities that, to a limited extent, are already being utilized,
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but perhaps could be utilized better to enhance judicial reputation. These include improvements to brand management, better
use of social media by the courts and individual judges, mechanisms to clean house when the entire judicial system of a country
is corrupt, and so on (pp 195–97). The mechanism that interested
us in particular is one that Garoupa and Ginsburg are rather
skeptical of: the relevance of postjudgeship employment and how
those employment opportunities might help incentivize judges,
while they are employed as judges, to pursue the right kinds of
reputational enhancements (pp 75–97).48 As a general matter, at
least in the US judicial system, the phenomenon of judges retiring
and going on to work in the private market is viewed with a degree of contempt (such judges are often referred to as “rent-ajudges”).49 But maybe judges should be encouraged to pursue such
postjudgeship employment. Maybe it would produce good incentives to generate the kind of reputation Garoupa and Ginsburg
suggest that judiciaries should be pursuing (and we are skeptical that they are). Below, we mention three sets of jobs judges
might take (we draw these examples in part from Garoupa and
Ginsburg), although the list is by no means exhaustive.
First, there are the jobs as independent investigators or on
independent review commissions, doing things like investigating scandals and writing reports on appropriate reforms that the
government should undertake (pp 79, 87, 89). These are quasijudicial high-status jobs in which the rewards go only to those
judges who have built a reputation of holding those in power to
account (after all, these commissions call for “independent” review usually). These are jobs that might be particularly attractive
in systems in which judges have to retire at a specified age and in
which they still have some years of productive work ahead of
them. The government in question, which is facing some sort of
scandal, might not want the investigations to occur, but needs the
public to be persuaded that a fair and impartial investigation has
occurred. Here, the hiring of a judge who has built a reputation
48 See pp 39, 173 (mentioning how the Spanish “superjudge” Baltasar Garzón, who
led the indictment of General Augusto Pinochet, had developed such a high reputation
outside his home jurisdiction that when he was indicted locally for pursuing Franco-era
crimes, he received numerous other jobs—and twenty-one honorary doctorates in other
countries).
49 See, for example, Anne S. Kim, Note, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44 Duke L J 166, 168, 175–76 (1994) (arguing that rent-a-judges are “undesirable
as a matter of public policy” and noting the large number of retired judges who become
rent-a-judges).
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for legitimacy and fearlessness in the face of government pressure
might be the best solution. And if the jobs are attractive enough,
and the possibility of getting them is real, then judges will strive
to generate the kind of reputation that will help them get these
jobs after they take retirement. Indeed, as Garoupa and Ginsburg
explain, there is sometimes a demand for judges to move from
their judicial roles into political roles when the political system is
seen as having become so flawed that what it needs is a leader
with the kind of reputation that a career in the judiciary generates (p 75).
Second, there are the jobs that judges might perform doing
so-called private judging—that is, sitting on arbitral tribunals
(pp 76, 79). Arbitration, because it is private and has less access
to the state’s monopoly on force, has to depend even more on the
legitimacy of the decisions its judges make than does the regular,
formal state system. The judges who get offered arbitrator jobs,
therefore, are necessarily those who built the right kind of reputation; the measure of their reputation is the willingness of private parties to abide by their decisions. There is a fly in the ointment here, which Garoupa and Ginsburg point out, in that the
presence of high-quality arbitral options may undermine the incentive for the local state-sponsored system to develop a high reputation (p 83). But this dynamic could easily cut the other way, as
well; the competition from the arbitral system might make state
systems work better, and particularly so if the arbitral system
picks its judges from amongst those who perform the best in the
state system.
Third, and less utilized than options one and two, but perhaps even more intriguing, is the possibility for judges who have
built reputations in one setting—either individual or collective—
to be hired by other judicial systems that want to, in effect, buy a
judicial reputation (pp 194–95). For example, one might imagine,
quite plausibly, a country or region that has decided that it wants
to build the kind of judicial system that will attract foreign investors. One can also imagine, equally plausibly, that one of the key
things that foreign investors are worried about is expropriation of
their assets by some future populist government that runs on a
platform of “take from the evil foreigners.”50 In this scenario, the
50 The classic work on this topic is Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J Econ Hist 803 (1989). See also generally Gary W.
Cox, Marketing Sovereign Promises: The English Model, 75 J Econ Hist 190 (2015).
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country seeking to attract foreign investment might consider offering positions in its judiciary to judges who have built strong
judicial reputations—and particularly reputations for standing
up to state misbehavior—elsewhere. The Dubai International
Financial Centre is one such example, in that it uses a commonlaw-modeled court system with judges hired from a variety of
common-law jurisdictions, explicitly to attract foreign investment, while being located within the United Arab Emirates’
civil-law system.51
To be clear, Garoupa and Ginsburg do not go as far as we do
in seeing the positive value for judicial-reputation creation via the
incentives provided by the prospect of future employment in alternative settings. They express concern about adverse selection
(that the wrong kind of person will be attracted to the judiciary)
(p 82) and negative effects on reputation (perhaps if judges are
seen as working harder in order to enhance their prospects for
future employment, as opposed to working hard in order to pursue justice or another “pure” goal, that will cause the public to
think worse of judges) (p 83). We are not so concerned. Adverse
selection problems can be ameliorated by having better selection
systems. And even if the wrong kinds of candidates get through
(the candidates who care more about self than others), that is not
such a big problem if these judges can be given the right kinds of
incentives to pursue the right kind of reputation. Garoupa and
Ginsburg, we think, could be more eager to embrace the possibilities for using the prospect of lucrative or prestigious postjudicial
employment as a means of enhancing the incentives for judges to
pursue reputation.
IV. ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONAL THEORIES
One reason why we are a bit skeptical of the functional claims
that Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg make is that we do not
think that judicial systems around the globe are as yet designed
to enhance reputation to the extent Garoupa and Ginsburg suggest. Plus, we think it plausible that there are alternative functional explanations for why judicial institutions are the way they
are, and Garoupa and Ginsburg have not persuaded us that these

51 See Alejandro Carballo, The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre:
Common Law Oasis or Mirage within the UAE?, 21 Arab L Q 91, 95–100 (2007); Jurisdiction: Opting In to the Dubai International Financial Centre (Linklaters, Dec 6, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/J6EJ-3S9W.
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alternative explanations are not also playing a role (perhaps
alongside reputation). Below, we sketch out one such explanation.
Garoupa and Ginsburg tell us that the reason different judiciaries have different structural features is that these different
structures are aimed at optimizing the proper amount of reputation that a particular judiciary needs to serve its society best (p 2).
And Garoupa and Ginsburg’s foil here is the path-dependence or
inertia explanation that dominates the literature (pp 7–8, 59). We
applaud the moves both to provide a functionalist explanation
and to question the standard path-dependence story for why we
have the institutions we do. But what if there were other functionalist explanations—ones that did not rest on reputational
considerations?
One such explanation is the holdout problem. Systems that
have strong norms or requirements as to unanimous decisionmaking are by definition more concerned with holdouts, because a requirement of unanimous decisionmaking necessarily
gives considerable power to anyone willing to threaten to hold
out.52 By contrast, there is relatively little danger of holdouts in a
highly individualized judicial system. In such systems, the judges
make up their own minds and their decisions get aggregated at
the end; there are no holdout problems, just winners and losers.
Once we see the decision to use one structure or the other to
design a judicial system in terms of the risk of holdouts, then the
next step is to ask whether different contexts call for the social
planners to be more or less concerned about holdouts. Imagine,
for example, a society that is highly polarized along race, religion,
and income grounds. Holdouts might be highly likely in such a
society in cases involving certain subject areas (for example, human or civil rights). And so one might expect that courts tackling
these issues would be individualized. However, one might also imagine certain types of topics (for example, issues having to do with
the banking sector’s stability) for which neither the public nor the
judiciary has strong preferences. For these types of topics, the risk
of a holdout might be minimal and the enhancement of the quality
of the decision by forcing the members of the court to discuss and
compromise might be considerable.
We are by no means certain that the foregoing holdout problem really is one that drives the difference in structures that one
52 See Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 Cornell L Rev 906, 922
(1988) (“The holdout problem occurs in its most extreme form when unanimous consent is
necessary.”).
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sees around the world. The point, though, is that it is a plausible
alternate functional explanation, and it has nothing to do with
reputation creation.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE (LIKELY) RELEVANCE OF GAROUPA
AND GINSBURG’S REPUTATIONAL THEORY
Our final observation is that regardless of whether Professors
Garoupa and Ginsburg’s view accurately represents the reality of
why current judicial systems are structured the way they are today (we suspect that there is much more path dependence in the
equation than Garoupa and Ginsburg are ready to concede), we
think that the reputational model is going to become more and
more important as time goes on. And that will happen not because
social planners realize that judicial systems should be designed to
pursue certain kinds of reputations, but because of the rapid
growth in recent years in the external monitoring, evaluation, and
relative ranking of judicial systems. As Garoupa and Ginsburg describe in their penultimate chapter, the past two decades have
seen phenomenal growth in the number of relative rankings of
judicial institutions around the world (p 176). Among the most
prominent of these are those produced by the World Bank and
Transparency International.53 But there are also rankings produced by academics and for-profit organizations.54 There are
weaknesses in these rankings, as numerous researchers (including one of the authors of this book) have pointed out.55 But they
are being constantly critiqued and improved and, most importantly, are taken seriously by the markets and therefore the
countries that are being rated. Credit rating agencies use them
and governments—particularly emerging-market governments—

53 See, for example, Anja Rohwer, Measuring Corruption: A Comparison between the
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, 7 CESifo DICE Report 42, 44–49 (Autumn 2009).
54 For discussions of rankings of judicial systems and individual judges in the US
context, see generally, for example, Thomas J. Miles, Do Attorney Surveys Measure Judicial Performance or Respondent Ideology? Evidence from Online Evaluations, 44 J Legal
Stud S231 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J Empirical Legal Stud 969 (2009). See also
generally Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 Duke L J 1313 (2009).
55 See, for example, Kevin E. Davis, Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative
Measures of Law, 10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 37, 41–46 (2014). See also generally Tom
Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 Hague J Rule L 269 (2011).
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frequently feel compelled to report them to foreign investors.56 A
recent bond issue by Mozambique (its first) is particularly illustrative. The country, in its bond prospectus, reported its rankings on both the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
and Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions
Index, and also discussed the rankings of neighboring countries
in Africa, such as South Africa.57 Put simply, if the quality of a
country’s judiciary is important to its cost of borrowing on the international markets, the country will make sure to invest in improving that system and its ranking—and that in turn means setting up the right incentives for judges to pursue the right kind of
reputation. Equally important for many poor countries is the fact
that development agencies often look to these indicators in determining where to allocate funding.58
But that is not all. As more and more information becomes
available about individual judges and courts and their performances, it becomes easier to rate them on factors such as the
speed with which they produce decisions, the rates at which those
decisions are reversed by higher courts, the rates at which they
are cited by other courts, the credentials of those who are selected
to be judges, the satisfaction levels of those who have had cases
before them, and so on. Again, there are criticisms that can fairly
be leveled at all of these ratings.59 But the bottom line is that we,
as a global society, are moving in the direction of being able to
increasingly evaluate not only the overall quality of a judicial system, but also individual courts and judges. In turn, to the extent
judges care about their evaluations (and we suspect they care, or
can be made to care), the result will surely be an enhanced pursuit of the kinds of reputation contained in these measures. And
that fact, Garoupa and Ginsburg posit, will affect the structuring
of judicial systems.
At bottom, Garoupa and Ginsburg have made an invaluable
contribution to the literature on judicial institutions not only in
56 For an example of the use of these measures by rating agencies, see Richard
Cantor, Moody’s Sovereign Rating Methodology *18–19 (Moody’s Investors Service, May
31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/WS2Q-GRFA (listing the World Bank indicators
as important determinants of a country’s credit rating).
57 See Prospectus Dated 15 April 2016: The Republic of Mozambique *12–13, 27–28
(Apr 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5PLD-AVE9.
58 See M.A. Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?, 22
Eur J Development Rsrch 31, 31, 34 (2010).
59 See, for example, Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U Pa L Rev 117, 130–54 (2013) (criticizing empirical studies that use
citation rates, reversal rates, and interjudge disparities to measure judicial quality).
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terms of providing an alternative paradigm for understanding
why we have the institutions we do have, but also in terms of
helping us predict the future shape that these institutions are
likely to take.

